Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Racial Anxieties in Adoption: Reflections on Adoptive Couple,
White Parenthood, and Constitutional Challenges to the ICWA
Addie C. Rolnick

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rolnick, Addie C., "Racial Anxieties in Adoption: Reflections on Adoptive Couple, White Parenthood, and
Constitutional Challenges to the ICWA" (2017). Scholarly Works. 1022.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1022

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

RACIAL ANXIETIES IN ADOPTION: REFLECTIONS ON
ADOPTIVE COUPLE, WHITE PARENTHOOD, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ICWA
Addie C. Rolnick & Kim Hai Pearson*
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is under fire from people
who argue that it interferes with adoptions and violates the constitution
by doing so. The current crop of lawsuits is an outgrowth of a 2012 case
in which the Supreme Court heard its second-ever challenge to the law.
While the Court sidestepped the most far-reaching anti-ICWA
arguments, the majority opinion evidenced a deep skepticism about the
law. This skepticism led the Court to narrow the law’s application so
that it didn’t apply to the family involved, and it seemed to invite
further challenges to the law.
In the case, an unmarried father sought to stop his ex-fiancée from
terminating his parental rights and allowing their daughter to be adopted
by an educated, middle class, white couple. The father argued that the
law applied to his situation because he is an enrolled member of the
Cherokee Nation.1 A cursory reading of the law’s text suggests that he
is correct. 2 If applied, it would have required adherence to stricter
procedural requirements than state law before the adoption could be
finalized.
Under the ICWA, a parent’s rights cannot be involuntarily
terminated in the absence of notice to the parents and the tribe,
appointed counsel, a showing that active efforts were made to prevent
the breakup of an Indian family, and a finding that continued custody by
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and Society Association’s Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network, and
participants in the AALS Mid-Year Workshop on Shifting Foundations: Family Law’s
Response to Changing Families.
1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
2. The law defines “Indian child” as any person under the age of 18 who is a member of
an Indian tribe, or a biological child of a tribal member who is herself eligible for membership.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). The father is a Cherokee citizen, and his daughter is also eligible for
citizenship under Cherokee law. See Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race,
Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 329 (2015). It
defines a parent as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child,” but does not include an
unwed father “where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9).
No argument was made in this case that the father did not acknowledge paternity. When he
found out about the pregnancy, he asked his fiancée to move up the wedding date. After the
breakup, he tried to contact her throughout the pregnancy, and he and his family tried to send
her gifts and money. He was named in adoption paperwork, and he was asked to sign a form
indicating his consent to the adoption before it proceeded. See id. at 301–04.
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the parent will harm the child.3 The father in this case wanted custody
of his daughter, and there was no suggestion made at any time that he
caused her harm. Application of the ICWA would not have prohibited
the adoption outright, but the presence of a stable and loving birth
parent who wanted to keep his child would have prevented her adoption
under the law. This outcome makes sense. In the absence of harm,
prospective adoptive parents are not typically permitted to keep a child,
even one they love and have cared for, over the objections of one of her
parents. And yet, if the father were not an Indian, state law would have
allowed his daughter to be given to another family despite his presence
and over his objections.4 Because the Court determined that the ICWA
didn’t apply, this is precisely what happened in the case.
Why didn’t the Court apply the ICWA? 5 One answer is that the
Court did not seem to believe or value the fact that the father and
daughter are Cherokee Indians. Resisting the idea that their Cherokee
status should matter in an adoption decision, it found a way not to apply
the law that made it matter. In her article “In the Name of the Child:
Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,”
Bethany R. Berger deftly deconstructs the arguments, 6 the majority
opinion, 7 and the back stories of the attorneys 8 and the Justices 9 to
reveal the way that anxieties about race, and adherence to the modern
version of colorblindness, led the Court to “do violence” to the law’s
text.10 These racial anxieties ran deep. The very first sentence of Justice
Alito’s opinion describes the baby as “1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.”11 By
framing the baby’s connection to the Cherokee Nation only in terms of
ancestry, Justice Alito revealed the Court’s fundamental investment in
the idea that race (defined by the Court as equivalent to ancestry) is

3. 25 U.S.C. § 1912. Even in cases of voluntary termination, consent is not valid under
the ICWA unless it is executed in writing before a judge and the judge certifies that the terms
and consequences were fully explained to the parent. Id. at § 1913.
4. See 133 S. Ct. at 2560.
5. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the ICWA did apply and that no
sufficient showing of harm justified involuntary termination of parental rights. See 133 S. Ct. at
2560.
6. Berger, supra note 2, at 325–27.
7. Id. at 327.
8. Id. at 310–11; see also Andrew Cohen, Indian Affairs, Adoption, and Race: The Baby
Veronica Case Comes to Washington, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013) (describing Paul Clement, the
attorney for the guardian ad litem, as seeking to “undermine Congressional authority over the
ICWA and all federal Indian law” and linking his arguments in the Adoptive Couple case to his
representation of a non-Indian gaming client engaged in a legal challenge to Indian gaming
rights in Massachusetts).
9. Berger, supra note 2, at 330.
10. Id. at 318.
11
133 S. Ct. at 2556.
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insignificant to identity. As Justice Roberts asked during oral argument,
is it “one drop of blood that triggers all these extraordinary rights?”12
The best (and most often given) response to this is that Indianness is
not race. 13 That is, it’s not reducible to a biological classification.
Professor Berger makes this point eloquently, pointing out that that the
ICWA should have applied because of the child’s eligibility for
citizenship (and the father’s citizenship) in the Cherokee Nation. Her
“quantum of Cherokee blood was irrelevant to her citizenship,”14 and
so, contrary to the Court’s repeated insistence, her fractional ancestry
“was not the reason her father had rights to object to her adoption.”15
12. Id. at 327. The Court’s skepticism regarding the ICWA is also apparent in the
opinion’s suggestion that application of the law would disadvantage Indian children by making
[non-Indian] people reluctant to adopt them, 133 S. Ct. at 2564–65; Berger, supra note 2, at 319
(explaining that this assertion is “implausible”) and its reference to the father’s argument as an
“ICWA trump card [played] at the eleventh hour,” 133 S. Ct. at 2565. It’s view regarding the
insignificance of the father’s Cherokee status is made clear by the opinion’s wholesale
dismissal of any aspect of the father’s Cherokee identity outside of ancestry, see Berger, supra
note 2, at 332–33 (detailing the father’s family’s political, cultural, and geographic integration
into the Cherokee Nation, all ignored by the Court) and in the way the majority opinion fails to
engage Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Court’s only ICWA
precedent and a case that strongly underscored the importance of the connection between Indian
tribes and their children. The Court’s dismissive treatment of the family’s Cherokee status was
no doubt fueled by the attitudes of others involved in the case. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent
Birth Father, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12-399, 13 (quoting guardian ad litem’s
finding that the advantages of “having Native American heritage ‘include[ed] free lunches and
free medical care and that they did have their little get togethers and their little dances’”).
13. Berger, supra note 2, at 335. In legal terms, Indianness is a political classification that
hinges here on citizenship (or eligibility for citizenship) in a federally recognized tribe, not a
racial classification. In our view, it makes no sense to claim, as some do, that Indianness has
nothing at all to do with race and racism. It is equally a mistake, however, to suggest that the
specter of race renders it less of a political status in the sense that the term is used to denote a
particular legal history in which the federal government has treated Indian tribes as separate
nations and has assumed unique powers to legislate with respect to tribes and indigenous people.
See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1026 (2011).
14. Berger, supra note 2, at 329.
15. Id. Unlike many other tribes, the Cherokee Nation does not require members to have
any specific fraction of ancestry; members must instead demonstrate descent from a person on
the historical tribal rolls. Const. of the Cherokee Nation, Art. IV. The fact that the Nation does
not rely on “blood quantum,” a concept that has been criticized for injecting racial requirements
into tribal citizenship, see, e.g. Kim TallBear, DNA, Blood, and Racializing the Tribe, 18
Wicazo Sa Review 81, 88-93 (2003) (summarizing critiques), provided little comfort the Court.
Instead, the Court seemed to view the Nation’s citizenship law as problematic because it extends
citizenship to people with an “insignificant” fraction of Cherokee ancestry. For a discussion of
the paradox faced by American Indian tribal nations in which they are simultaneously viewed as
(illegal) racially exclusive communities and as not being sufficiently Indian, see generally
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 2 Wyoming L. Rev. 295,
(2011), and Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 Cal. L. Rev. Cir. 23
(2013).
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Indian tribes have a different relationship with the federal government
than any other groups, a relationship based largely on treaties and
recognition of nationhood. They are recognized as governments and
their courts generally exercise jurisdiction over family and child welfare
matters involving their children. That is why the baby’s Cherokee-ness
mattered in a way that her Hispanic-ness (on her mother’s side) did
not.16
While correct, this response has not placated critics. After the
decision, the Department of the Interior issued new guidelines in 201517
intended to strengthen the force of the ICWA in state courts. Two new
lawsuits were immediately filed challenging the constitutionality of the
ICWA and the guidelines. 18 Where the opinion in Baby Girl raised
questions about Indianness, race, and adoption but decided the case on
statutory grounds, these lawsuits directly attack the ICWA as an
unconstitutional race-based law. 19
16. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (prohibiting express consideration of a
step-parent’s non-white race as a dispositive factor in a custody dispute between divorced
parents). Even though disputes about custody are very different from adoption proceedings,
courts’ attitudes about race filter throughout all decisions that involve questions about the best
interests of children, including custody, placement, termination, and adoption.
17
In 2016, after notice and comment, the Department promulgated new regulations to
implement the ICWA and issued a revised set of guidelines. See Indian Child Welfare Act
Proceedings Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778 (June 14, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau
of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (Dec. 2016).
18
A.D. v. Washburn, Case No. 2:15-cv-01259-DKD (D. Ariz., filed Jul. 6, 2015); National
Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015). Prior to publication of
this article, the complaint in A.D. v. Washburn was dismissed without prejudice for lack of
standing. Order, A.D. v. Washburn, Case No. 2:15-cv-01259-NVW (D. Ariz., Mar. 16, 2017), at
*19 (“Any true injury to any child or interested adult can be addressed in the state court
proceeding itself, based on actual facts before the court, not on hypothetical concerns. If any
Plaintiffs encounter future real harm in their own proceedings, the judge in their own case can
discern the rules of decision. They do not have standing to have this Court pre-adjudicate for
state court judges how to rule on facts that may arise and that may be governed by statutes or
guidelines that this Court may think invalid.”). The plaintiffs in National Council for Adoption
challenged the 2015 guidelines on administrative and constitutional grounds. The district court
denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the administrative claims, 156 F. Supp. 3d
727 (E.D. Va. 2015), and dismissed the constitutional challenges, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, Case 1:15-cv-00675-GBL-MSN (E.D. Va. Dec.
9, 2015), at *10 – *15, finding that the plaintiffs had not identified any authority to support their
equal protection claim. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit later vacated the district
court’s judgment because the Bureau withdrew the 2015 guidelines and replaced them with new
ones in December 2016. Order, National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, Case No. 16-1110
(1:15-cv-00675-GBL-MSN) (4th Cir., Jan. 31, 2017). See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (Dec. 2016), at 6.
19
In A.D. v. Washburn, the complaint frames the ICWA as unconstitutional because it allegedly
distinguishes among groups of children because of race: “Children with Indian ancestry,
however, are still living in the era of Plessy v. Ferguson. Alone among American children, their
adoption and foster care placements are determined not in accord with their best interests but by
their ethnicity, as a result of a well-intentioned but profoundly flawed and unconstitutional
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While we agree that the Court improperly inserted a discussion of
race into its consideration of an Indian statute,20 the subsequent suits
illustrate the folly in dismissing the Court’s racial anxieties too quickly.
In this essay, we seek to engage the Court’s fears directly. For, although
Indians are not identically situated to other racial minority groups, the
harm that the ICWA was designed to counteract was a racial harm in the
sense that the work of severing Indian children from Indian tribal
communities was part of an effort to eradicate those communities
(defined by law and social practice as racially inferior) by absorbing
them via interracial marriage and cultural reprogramming. As Professor
Berger explains, the practice of removing Indian children from their
communities was directly linked to both the racialization of Indians21
and colonial efforts to acquire indigenous land and dominate indigenous
people.22 The ICWA is a legal intervention intended to counteract this
process. While it may not be a race-based statute, it seems that the
Court’s skepticism of such an intervention was race-based, and the new
lawsuits seek to mine this skepticism. It is this fear that we hope to
interrogate: What is so terrifying about a law that so strongly protects
minority families, works to ensure that minority children remain in their
communities, and recognizes the rights of communities to control
decisions regarding the placement of their children?
I. DISPLACED CHILDREN
The Indian Child Welfare Act was a response to a particularly
chilling history in which generations of Native children were removed
from their homes and communities. Sometimes removal occurred with
the express intent of annihilating tribal culture and literally handing
Native children over to white institutions to be remade.23 Such was the
goal of federally run boarding schools in the late 1800s and early
1900s.24 Native people have stories of children being kidnapped from
federal law, the Indian Child Welfare Act.” A.D. v. Washburn Complaint, at 29. The National
Council for Adoption complaint states, “ICWA violates the due process and equal protection
rights of ‘Indian children’ as well.” National Council for Adoption v Jewell Complaint, at 4.
20. See Berger, supra note 2, at 325–36; see also Alyosha Goldstein, Possessive
Investment: Indian Removals and the Affective Entitlements of Whiteness, 66 AM. Q. 1077, 1077
(2014); Aura Bogado, The Cherokee Nation’s Baby Girl Goes on Trial, COLORLINES (Apr. 24,
2014), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/cherokee-nations-baby-girl-goes-trial.
21. Berger, supra note 2, at 330 (explaining that the racial boundary between whiteness
and Indianness was “deliberately porous” in order to facilitate disappearance, while the racial
boundary between whiteness and blackness was “rigidly maintained” in order to increase the
supply of slave labor).
22. Id. at 330–31.
23. Id. at 351 (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2012)).
24. See generally K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, THEY CALLED IT PRAIRIE LIGHT: THE STORY
OF CHILOCCO INDIAN SCHOOL (1994) (relating Indian experience of assimilation through
boarding school program); MARGARET CONNELL SZASZ, EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN
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their families and taken far away to a boarding school, where they were
physically and mentally abused.25 But people also tell stories of parents
voluntarily sending their children to school, and of positive educational
experiences at some of the schools. 26 Like anything else, it is a
complicated history that is not easily cabined in a voluntary versus
forced dichotomy.
This express assimilation campaign was eventually rejected, but
Indian children continued to be removed from tribal communities via
state child welfare workers, foster care, and adoption. 27 Although
removal was no longer animated by a malicious intent to annihilate
Indian culture, it was premised on the assumption that Indian families
and, more pointedly, Indian communities were dysfunctional and that
leaving children in the custody of their parents or even their extended
families and communities would work a harm so severe that child
welfare intervention was needed. The bar for showing that removal was
necessary was quite low. 28 Children were removed based on vague
INDIAN: THE ROAD TO SELF-DETERMINATION SINCE 1928 (1999) (discussing educational
programs as a vehicle for assimilation of Indians). See also RICHARD H. PRATT, THE
ADVANTAGES OF MINGLING INDIANS WITH WHITES (1892) (explaining the goal of the boarding
schools to “kill the Indian in order to save the man”).
25. See Maureen Smith, Forever Changed: Boarding School Narratives of American
Indian Identity in the U.S. and Canada, 2 INDIGENOUS NATIONS STUDIES J. 57 (2001) (analyzing
boarding school narratives); Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its
Continuing Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L.
REV. 149, 150–55 (2007) (detailing a history of government boarding schools for Indian
children); KENNETH LINCOLN, NATIVE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE (1985) (referring to stories of
kidnapping); see also Native Americans File Lawsuit Against Boarding School Abuses, VOICE
OF AMERICA NEWS (Oct. 30, 2009) (describing litigants’ claims of physical abuse and neglect in
lawsuit against government-sponsored, church-run boarding schools); Gretchen Millich,
Survivors of Indian Boarding Schools Tell Their Stories, WKAR (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://wkar.org/post/survivors-indian-boarding-schools-tell-their-stories (recounting stories of
abuse from various schools).
26. See generally, e.g., LOUISE UDALL, ME AND MINE: THE LIFE STORY OF HELEN
SEKAQUAPTEWA (1969); POLINGAYSI QOYAWAYMA AND VADA F. CARLSON, NO TURNING BACK:
A HOPI INDIAN WOMAN’S STRUGGLE TO LIVE IN TWO WORLDS (1977); see also LOMAWAIMA,
supra note 20 (recounting stories of positive experiences despite repressive institutional
practices at Chilocco in the 1920s and 1930s); Native Americans File Lawsuit Against Boarding
School Abuses, supra note 21 (quoting one attendee from the 1940s who “value[d] the religious
training I got there as well as the academics”).
27. Berger, supra note 2, at 250 (citing LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE
POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION (2012)) (“American Indian children,
like African American children, became targets for child welfare removals after they began
receiving state-financed welfare assistance in large numbers.”).
28. Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The Congressional Foray into
the Adoption Process, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 85 (1994) (“Congress was especially critical of
the general standards employed by the child welfare system in determining the necessity of
intervention. One survey cited found that ninety-nine percent of the cases involving the removal
of Indian children from their families were predicated “on such vague grounds as ‘neglect’ or
‘social deprivation’ and on allegations of the emotional damage the children were subjected to
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allegations of neglect or deprivation with very little except for
misunderstandings of tribal cultures, devaluation of extended family
structures, and racist assumptions about Indian people to back them
up.29
Indian children are not the only children who have been
involuntarily removed from their parents and communities at
disproportionately high rates, nor the only population subjected to
wholesale transfer out of their communities and into “good” white
homes. Although various minority groups have experienced the removal
and/or placement of their children in ways unique to each group and
historical moment, there are strong thematic ties in the discourse
surrounding childhood displacement that bear exploring. African
American and Latino children, especially poor children, are removed
from their homes and placed in foster care at higher rates than other
children.30 Analyzing the statistics in conjunction with evidence of caseby living with their parents.” Congress was altogether dismayed at the lack of understanding
non-Indian child welfare workers had of Indian family society.”). Systematic removal of Indian
children is not only a relic of the past; South Dakota child welfare officials were recently found
to have adopted procedures facilitating easy removal of Indian children from their homes,
violating the ICWA and denying Indian parents their rights to due process prior to removal. See
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 773 (D.S.D. 2015) (granting partial
summary judgment); 2016 WL 697117 (D.S.D. Jan. 19, 2017) (denying reconsideration request
in substantial part).
29. Gallagher, supra note 24, at n.27, citing H.R.REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at
10 (1978). (“Indian communities are often shocked to learn that parents they regard as excellent
caregivers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers . . . . For example, the dynamics
of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood. An Indian child may have scores of,
perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of the
family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be
socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as
neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights. Because in some communities the
social workers have, in a sense, become a part of the extended family, parents will sometimes
turn to the welfare department for temporary care of their children, failing to realize that their
action is perceived quite differently by non-Indians.”); see also Margaret Howard, Transracial
Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 503, 520 (1984)
(describing the role of biases and misunderstandings in facilitating removal of Indian children).
30. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 54–55, 224
(2002) (documenting overrepresentation of black children in child welfare system, attributing
disparity to view of black families as pathological and inadequate, and showing destructive
effects of child welfare policies on black families); Dorothy Roberts, Race and Class in the
Child Welfare System, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/c
aseworker/roberts.html (noting that, once a child welfare investigation begins, African
American children are placed in foster care at nearly twice the rate of whites) [hereinafter
ROBERTS, Race and Class]; Annette R. Appell, ‘Bad’ Mothers and Spanish-Speaking
Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J. 102, 113–21 (2007) (presenting case study of how linguistic and
cultural differences can lead to “inappropriate and culturally incompetent child welfare
interventions” for Spanish-speaking Latino families); see generally CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR
KIN (1974) (arguing that social welfare policies are based on stereotypes of black families as
dysfunctional and self destructive and challenging those stereotypes by documenting kinship
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by-case mishandling and mistreatment by child welfare agencies,
Dorothy Roberts argues, would lead a person to “conclude that [child
welfare] is an institution designed to monitor, regulate, and punish poor
families of color.”31
A generation of adoptees from Korea and China are coming of age in
their adoptive homes, 32 most of them with white families and most
living in the United States. A younger set of children, those who lived
through the 2012 Haiti earthquake, may have a similar experience in
twenty years. 33 Like some of the Indian children sent to boarding
schools, some of these children were “voluntarily” placed—some the
children of single mothers with few options, and others the children of
families facing such a lack of resources that they believed their children
would be better off raised by strangers in another country.
Unlike Korean and Chinese adoptees, and perhaps even more than
American Indian children, 34 African American children are not
transferred into white families so much as they languish in the purgatory
of foster care because they are viewed as the least desirable in the racial

and child-rearing networks in a poor black community).
31. ROBERTS, Race and Class, supra note 26.
32. According to the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare by 2002, an estimated
200,000 Korean children had been placed internationally, most to the U.S. The Evan B.
Donaldson Adoption Institute estimates that China has placed 70,000 children in international
adoptions.
33. Ginger Thompson, After Haiti Quake, the Chaos of U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/world/americas/04adoption.html. Thompson’s
article describes the issues raised by post-earthquake adoptions out of Haiti to the U.S., citing
concerns raised by child protection advocates. “[T]hose ends [placing them in middle class U.S.
homes] do not justify the means. Rushing children out of familiar environments in a crisis can
worsen their trauma… Expediting adoptions in countries like Haiti – where it is not uncommon
for people to turn children over to orphanages for money – violates children’s rights and leaves
them at risk of trafficking.” In contrast, adoption advocates expressed concern about temporarily
housing children in-country, arguing that “attempts to locate the children’s biological relatives
[would] deny tens of thousands of needy Haitian orphans the opportunity to be placed in loving
homes.” Id. See also Kathryn Joyce, The Child Catchers: Rescue, Trafficking, and the New
Gospel of Adoption (2013), at 3-5 (detailing the media framing of Haiti as “a sort of animal
kingdom from which children must be rescued, lest . . . ‘they won’t even grow up to be
human’”). Joyce’s account of the post-disaster Haitian adoptions reveals that the efforts to
remove children by foreign adoption agencies and Haitian orphanages, citing the children’s best
interests, was occurring at the same time U.S. government officials made it clear that adult
Haitian refugees were unwelcome in the United States.
34. Berger, supra note 2 at 332 (“adoption of Indian children into non-Indian homes has a
particularly honored and accepted place in American culture, and the notion of easy and
beneficial assimilation of Indian children into white culture helps fuel the desirability of Indian
children as adoptees”). While Professor Berger asserts that Indian children are treated just like
white children in terms of racial desirability in adoptions, id. at 322, the reality is likely more
complicated. As the foster care data in footnote 35, infra, suggests, Native American children
are over-represented in foster care.
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hierarchy of adoption. 35 As Roberts explains, “[m]ost white children
who enter the system are permitted to stay with their families, avoiding
the emotional damage and physical risks of foster care placement, while
most black children are taken away from theirs. And once removed
from their homes, black children remain in foster care longer, are
moved more often, receive fewer services, and are less likely to be
either returned home or adopted than any other children.”36
II. RACE IN FAMILY LAW
Race is uniquely devalued in family law proceedings, 37 especially
adoptions.38 While many other aspects of a child’s identity development
may be important factors in whether the law is willing to intervene in
parenting decisions, custody, or placement, race is a third rail. As a
comparison, courts attend to a child’s religious identity, usually by
considering the parents’ religious beliefs and traditions, even if such
35. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Allan Collard-Wexler et al., Gender and Racial Biases:
Evidence from Child Adoption, CESifo, Working Paper No. 2921 (2010) (showing that the
group which was least preferred by prospective adoptive parents was African American boys);
United States Gov’t Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Recent Demographic Trends in
Foster Care, Data Brief 2013-1 (September 2013) (showing that despite a marked decline of
47% of African American children in foster care since 2002, they still represent more than one
quarter of all children in foster care; after 2009, Native American children have the highest rates
of representation in foster care). (According the the same report, between 2002 and 2012, all
groups experienced a decrease in the number of children placed in foster care, but children who
identified as two or more races experienced an increase. We note that, although the report shows
a net decrease in the number of foster children overall, this pattern also likely reflects a change
in demographic categories used to count children in the system.) Adoptive parents’ racial
preferences drive the adoption market domestically and internationally. See Kim H. Pearson,
Displaced Mothers, Absent and Unnatural Fathers: LGBT Transracial Adoption, 19 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 149, 165–66 (2012) (describing the shift away from domestic foster care
adoptions and towards international adoption because of shortages of white adoptive children,
making children believed to be capable of passing as white preferable).
36. ROBERTS, Race and Class, supra note 26.
37. Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 Ill. App. 2d 482 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984); In re Davis v. Davis, 240 A.D.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Ebirim v.
Ebirim, 9 Neb. App. 740 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000); Foster v. Waterman, 738 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2007) (representative family law proceedings showing how courts measure the value of
race, ranging from express non-consideration to a view of race that refers to cultural activities
and proximity to racially diverse populations as sufficiently protective of children’s racial
identity development).
38. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (2000) (summarizing federal laws that limit
explicit consideration of race in adoption, but criticizing what the author views as a tendency in
practice to protect minority children’s birth families and communities of origin at the expense of
the children’s best interests); Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2008)
(analyzing differences in the legal treatment of racial minority children and Native American
children, who are covered by the ICWA, in placement proceedings).
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attentiveness may violate one of the parent’s constitutional rights. 39
Another point of comparison is sexual orientation; in some states
parents are prohibited from forcing their gay children to attend
conversion therapy. 40 Courts and legislatures make the connection
between LGBT children’s poor health outcomes, including high
depression, substance abuse, and suicide rates and attempts to change
their sexual identity development. 41 The law is willing to regulate
parenting—normally considered a private sphere—to protect the child
from the harm that will come from seeking to change that child’s sexual
identity. In contrast, the law does not similarly attend to children’s
racial identity development, assuming that a child’s racial identity is
malleable, fungible, and of less significance to a child’s innate sense of
self than sexual orientation.42 This is the case despite having data that
suggest some transracially adopted children have negative outcomes
linked to poor racial identity development and severed connections to
their communities.43
What would it look like for the law to value and protect a child’s
racial identity? The National Association of Black Social Workers
(NABSW) proposed legislation in the late 1980s and early 1990s
modeled on the ICWA that would have required states to give “due
consideration” to a child’s race and established a placement preference
first for a blood relative and, if that were not available, for a same-race
39. Jennifer Ann Drobac, For the Sake of the Children: Court Consideration of Religion
in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1998) (a survey of over fifty cases
showed that courts “consider the religious beliefs and practices of parents in determining
custody of children”); Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family
Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540 (2004) (calling for the development of a pluralistic approach to family
law in response to increasing diversity in religious beliefs).
40. California passed SB 1172 in 2012 and Governor Christie signed A-3371, New
Jersey’s gay conversion therapy ban, into law in 2013.
41. Tina Susman, Chris Christie Signs N.J. Bill Banning Gay Conversion Therapy, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/nation/la-na-nn-chris-christiegay-conversion-20130819.
42. See generally Kim H. Pearson, Legal Solutions for APA Transracial Adoptees, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1179 (2013).
43. See Sueyoung L. Song, The Relationship Among Culture-Specific Factors, Pubertal
Timing, and Body Image and Eating Disordered Symptoms Among Adopted Korean Adolescent
Girls 8 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with the
author); Hjern et al., Suicide, Psychiatric Illness, and Social Maladjustment in Intercountry
Adoptees in Sweden: A Cohort Study, 360 LANCET 443 (2002); Nam Soon Huh & William J.
Reid, Transracial Adoption and Ethnic Identity: A Korean Example, 43 INT’L SOC. WORK 75
(2000) (qualitative study of transracial adoptees’ experiences with race). See also Brief for
Adult Pre-ICWA Indian Adoptees et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Birth Father and The
Cherokee Nation, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399)
(describing how some adoptive parents hid or denigrated their children’s Indian identities and
how, for the adoptees, the often-difficult process of reconnecting to their tribal communities
“affected the self-discovery and fulfillment that ordinarily occur naturally for children raised in
families and communities with particular cultural, social, and spiritual traditions”).
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family. 44 The proposed law would not have prohibited transracial
adoption; it would have required state agencies to consider race and,
like the ICWA, would have required them to follow the established
placement preferences absent good cause to the contrary. 45 By
establishing a legal preference for placement of minority children in
same-race adoptive homes, the law would have forced the child welfare
system to acknowledge and attend to the importance of racial identity
development in children, and it would have attached legal value to
African American and other minority families and communities, the
historical devaluation of which has led to the breakup of many families.
The law never passed at the federal level, although at least one state
adopted similar legislation.46
We do not intend here to advocate for passage of the NABSW bill.
The proposed legislation had many flaws,47 and we do not necessarily
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, PRESERVING AFRICAN
AMERICAN FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND ACTION BEYOND THE RHETORIC (1991), available at
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nabsw.org/resource/collection/0D2D2404-77EB-49B5-962E7E6FADBF3D0D/Preserving_African_American_Families.pdf (describing and reiterating 1986
proposal and reproducing proposed legislation).
45. The placement preferences mimicked those in the ICWA. The proposed bill would
have “authorize[d] child-placing agencies to give preference, ‘in the absence of good cause to
the contrary’ to placing a child with a person or persons related by blood to the child, or, if that
would be detrimental to the child or a relative is not available, a family with the same racial or
ethnic heritage of the child.” Indeed, the proposal was put forth as a suggested amendment to the
Indian Child Welfare Act. Id. at 6.
46. See National African American Heritage Child Welfare Act, Minn. Ch. 278-S.F. no.
723 (1983), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/?id=278&year=1983&type=0. The
MMCHPA was passed in 1983 (before the NABSW issued its 1986 position paper and proposed
legislation). By 1997 the law had been amended several times to replace racial considerations
with the best interests of the child standard to bring the law into compliance with new federal
laws that prohibited the “use of race or ethnicity as a basis for adoption or foster care
placement.” Minnesota Legislative Reference Library, Minnesota Minority Child Heritage
Protection Act, http://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/issues/issues.aspx?issue=mmchpa. Illinois also
considered a similar bill. African American Heritage Child Welfare Act, H.B. 1913 (91st
General Assembly 1999–2000).
47. On its face, the proposal had drafting and coverage problems. It employed the vague
term “minority ethnic heritage” to describe the children it would apply to, it failed to set forth
guidelines for dealing with mixed-race children, it enshrined a particular version of the interplay
between racial and religious identity preservation, and it failed to address the issues presented
by “consensual” international adoptions. The proposal’s more fundamental flaw, however, is
that it was built around two main tools: procedural barriers to removal and placement
preferences. Although these were the two provisions at issue in Adoptive Couple, they are
arguably the least important provisions of the ICWA, which also provides for tribal court
jurisdiction over child welfare matters involving Indian children. 25 U.S.C. § 1911. It is the
jurisdictional provisions that have had the greatest impact, giving tribal communities control
over what happens to thousands of Indian children, including children for whom removal from
home was necessary because of actual or potential harm. For a more thoughtful proposal that
would raise the standards for removal of African American children along with other
interventions targeted to the specific circumstances of African American children and families,
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believe that a bill modeled on the ICWA is workable or desirable where
the child’s community does not coincide with a government entity.48
We want to focus instead on the response: Congress passed two separate
laws specifically prohibiting states from weighing race heavily in
placement and adoption decisions. The Multi-Ethnic Placement Act49
prohibits states from denying a person the right to become a foster or
adoptive parent “solely on the basis of the race” of the child involved
and from “delay[ing] or deny[ing] placement” of any child “solely on
the basis of race.” Although it permits states to “consider [a child’s]
cultural, ethnic, or racial background,” race is singled out as a factor
that cannot be important enough to base a decision on.50 The Interethnic
Placement Amendments strengthened the MEPA’s prohibitions by
imposing penalties for violating it.51
By prohibiting placement decisions based on race, the MEPA stops
state child welfare agencies from assigning legal value to race. To the
extent that race can be considered, it is viewed as only an individualized
aspect of personality development, an idea that has been conceived
thinly, even stereotypically, by courts that do address it.52 Like in the
case law governing the use of race in higher education admission
standards, the MEPA ensures that race can only be considered as a
personal quality and, even then, as one of many factors.53 At the same
see Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for AfricanAmerican Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 Berkeley J. Afr-Am. L. & Pol’y 109,
125-130 (2008).
48. Inter-country adoptions, such the adoption of Haitian children by U.S. families, might
present a better parallel to American Indian children because the Haitian government has a role
in decisions regarding removal and placement of Haitian children. Similarly, the Hague
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention) is a system of central government
authorities complying with agreed upon guidelines in the protection of children who are
removed from home countries and placed in Convention-participating countries. The
Convention, like the ICWA, does not ban adoption; instead, it creates child-centric guidelines as
procedural protections to value the child’s interests in her connection to her community.
49. Pub. L. No. 103-382 (1994).
50. The Department of Health and Human Services has reported that state agencies
sometimes avoid all consideration of a child’s race out of fear of violating the law. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Family Services, Office of Civil
Rights, Ensuring the Best Interests of Children Through Compliance with the Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, as amended, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/resources/specialtopics/adoption/mepatraingppt.pdf. See also
National Association of Black Social Workers, Preserving Families of African Ancestry (2003),
available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nabsw.org/resource/collection/0D2D2404-77EB-49B5962E-7E6FADBF3D0D/Preserving_Families_of_African_Ancestry.pdf (calling for repeal of
MEPA and IEPA).
51. Pub. L. No. 104-188 (1996). The IEP amendments also clarified that the MEPA did
not affect the ICWA in any way.
52. See sources cited, supra note 33.
53. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329, 337 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
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time, it prohibits state actors from establishing a legal regime that
makes it more difficult to break up minority families and, if families are
disrupted, re-directs minority children back into their families and
communities wherever possible. In other words, the MEPA prevents
states from making a structural intervention to correct for the historical
devaluation of minority families and communities that led directly to
the transfer of so many children out of them. 54 It also forecloses
consideration of the way that white race has always operated as a clear
plus factor in determining which families were considered the most
ideal adoptive placements and how proximity to whiteness has always
defined a child’s desirability in the marketplace of adoption. The
problem is not special consideration of race; it is that race is the only
thing that can’t be accorded primary importance, despite its central role
in the history of child welfare and adoption.
The ICWA is an exception to this rule in that it is a legislative
regime that changes the procedures governing the breakup of Indian
families and the removal of Indian children from Indian communities.55
It forces state courts to acknowledge a child’s Indianness, putting the
responsibility on the child welfare system to determine whether
someone is an “Indian child” and to contact the child’s tribe. 56 It
establishes a preference for tribal control over the proceedings by
requiring states to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court unless the tribe
244, 271 (2003); Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2408 (2013).
54. This is also consistent with the cases holding that the goal of undoing generalized past
racism is not a sufficiently compelling interest to permit use of racial classifications in the
present. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); id. at 239 (Scalia,
J.,concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality
opinion); id. at 505–06 (opinion of the Court); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438U.S.
265, 289–90, 307–10 (1978).
55. The ICWA can be justified even under the Court’s narrow approach to racial remedies
under several theories. The primary approach is that Indian classifications are political ones that
depend on a person’s relationship to a recognized tribe, so Indian classifications are not
governed by the law on racial classifications. Even acknowledging that Indian legal status often
overlaps with Indian racial status, tribes have clear membership rules, recognized leadership,
and federally-acknowledged legal institutions that make them uniquely able to exercise
authority over removal and adoption proceedings. Furthermore, even if the Court were to apply
strict scrutiny to Indian classifications, the harm that the ICWA was meant to counteract was so
direct, specific, and well documented that a racial classification could permissibly be employed
to remedy it. Rolnick, supra note 12, at 995–96 (explaining different legal theories for
upholding Indian legislation); CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, WHAT’S RACE GOT TO DO WITH IT?: THE
STORY OF MORTON V. MANCARI, IN RACE LAW STORIES 237, 238, 257 (Rachel F. Moran &
Devon Wayne Carbado, eds., 2008); Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential”
Treatment, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 943, 955–58 (2002); see also MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
ICWA AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30: FACING THE
FUTURE 29 (2009) (arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause provides a constitutional basis for
the ICWA).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (c).
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does not or cannot accept it.57 When the case remains in state court, it
forces the actors (from caseworkers to judges) to carefully justify
removal and placement outside the child’s community by adding
heightened requirements for removal and termination58 and establishing
a hierarchy of placement preferences. 59 Most importantly, the ICWA
recognizes that the relationship between tribe and child is not simply
one of personal identity or self-esteem, but is in fact the key to the
continued existence of the tribe, which is in turn a fundamental aspect
of the child’s “best interests.”60
It bears reiterating that the ICWA’s intervention is structural,61 not
substantive. It doesn’t require a particular outcome,62 and none of its
barriers are absolute. A child can still be removed, and a parent’s rights
terminated, if there is a showing that the child faces serious harm.63 A
court can depart from the placement preference for good cause. 64
Instead, it tilts the process in favor of keeping the child in the tribal
community in order to counteract the strong historical advantage
accorded to white parents that resulted in contests for children that
Indian parents (and tribes) often lost. Indeed, many mainstream child
welfare organizations have touted the ICWA as the “gold standard” for
child welfare.65 It prevents a court from doing precisely what courts did
57. Id. at § 1911 (b).
58. Id. at §§ 1912, 1913.
59. Id. at § 1915 (preference for placement with members of the child’s family, members
of the child’s tribe, and other Indian families, in that order).
60. Id. at § 1901(c). The Court’s only prior ICWA decision, Holyfield, underscored this
aspect of the law by holding that the tribe’s interest (and the child’s future interest in its
connection to the tribe) could outweigh an Indian parent’s fully informed attempt to circumvent
its provisions. The Adoptive Couple opinion ignores this aspect of the law, characterizing it as
nothing more than a law protecting the individual interests of Indian parents.
61. Rolnick, supra note 20, at 1042–43 (describing the ICWA as a structural intervention
that “explicitly acknowledges the link between the individualized effects of Indian racialization
and the political rights of tribal governments”); Briggs, supra note 25 (“ICWA does not
determine who gets a child. It determines jurisdiction –- who gets to decide who gets a child…
ICWA does not provide special ‘racial entitlements’; it treats (some) American Indians as
having a distinct political status conferred by treaty rights. . . [A]ll ICWA does is give birth
parents rights that many think they should have regardless . . . .”)
62
In Holyfield, the Court affirmed exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over a voluntary adoption
of children domiciled on the reservation in compliance with the Act, ordering that the case be
transferred to tribal court despite the children’s three-year placement with the prospective
adoptive parents. After review of available options, the tribal court placed the children back in
the same non-Indian adoptive home that had been chosen by the birth parents who had
originally tried to avoid the tribe’s jurisdiction, ordering the adoptive mother to maintain contact
with the children’s extended family and tribe. Maldonado, supra note 36, at 17.
63
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f).
64
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). A child’s tribe can also establish a different order or preference. 25
U.S.C. § 1915(c).
65
See National Indian Child Welfare Association, Letter to Elizabeth Appel, U.S. Dept. of the
Interior,
available
at
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for decades: removing a child from her family and community, placing
her with a white family in another state just because that new family
seems better, and offering only a cursory justification for the decision.
III. WHITENESS AND IDEAL PARENTHOOD
Within a year of the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple, an entirely
different kind of case involving parents and children thrust questions
about race and family into the public eye. Jennifer Cramblett, one half
of a white lesbian couple living in a small town in Ohio, sued Midwest
Sperm Bank for mistakenly delivering sperm from an African American
donor resulting in a biracial child.66 The case was a breach of contract
and wrongful birth action,67 and it made out a claim for damages based
not upon the fact that Cramblett and her partner do not love their
daughter (they do), but upon the loss suffered by a family who expects
to be all white and then loses that status. In her complaint, Cramblett
alleged that she “must relocate to a racially diverse community with
good schools.”68 Her complaint implied that there is a legal harm that
should be remedied for her inability to remain near her “all-white
community [and] all-white, and often unconsciously insensitive family”
because of her daughter’s “irrepressible” differences.69 In other words,
the complaint explained that being part of her white community has
legal value and that having to move to a more “diverse” area would
entail a quantifiable cost. Some of this cost is material: Cramblett and
her partner moved to the all-white town because its schools are better,
and they must now send their daughter to potentially worse schools
because they understand that being the only African American child at
this “good” school will harm her even more. White communities—their
schools, their associations, their distance from non-white
http://www.nicwa.org/Indian_Child_Welfare_Act/NICWA_Comments_on_ICWA_Regs.pdf
(citing briefs and public comments filed by Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare League of
American, Children’s Defense Fund, Donaldson Adoption Institute, North American Council on
Adoptable Children, Voice for Adoption, and others) (“ICWA has been deemed the ‘gold
standard of child welfare practice’ by mainstream organizations.”) .
66. Complaint for Wrongful Birth and Breach of Warranty, Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm
Bank (Cook County, Illinois Cir. Court, Sept. 29, 2014).
67
A judge dismissed the wrongful birth and breach of warranty claims in September, but gave
Cramblett the option to re-file the case as a negligence claim. Clifford Ward, Suit Filed Over
Mix-Up at Downer’s Grove Sperm Bank is Dismissed, Chicago Tribune (September 3, 2015),
available at: http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/downers-grove/news/ct-dupage-spermbank-suit-met-0904-20150903-story.html. Cramblett has since filed a negligence complaint
based on substantially the same allegations. See Plaintiff’s Complaint for Consumer Fraud,
Common Law Fraud, Willful and Wanton Misconduct, Common Law Negligence, Breach of
Contract and Breach of Warranty, No. 16-cv-04553 (N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 22, 2016).
68. Complaint for Wrongful Birth, at 7.
69. Id. at 6–7.
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communities—are valuable in this equation. The unspoken implication
that follows is that non-white communities are not.
These cases may seem to have little in common on the surface: one
is an adoption case originating with a separated, never-married
heterosexual couple and an Indian child, while the other is a case arising
out of an intact lesbian couple’s efforts to start a family using artificial
reproductive technologies, and a case that does not involve Indian
children at all. Both cases, however, involve white couples seeking to
parent through non-traditional methods, and both involve non-white
children. In each case, a white, upper-middle class, educated couple
appears to have done everything right in their quest to start a family,
including making a substantial investment of time and money. In our
view, access to this particular vision of voluntary, resource-intensive
family formation provides significant advantages to parents.
In each case, the child’s race is problematized. The difference lies in
the proposed solution: for the Capobiancos, the preferred solution is to
ignore differences that they view as only skin-deep, absorb her fully
into their home, and erase any aspect of her difference. Brown’s
invocation of the ICWA and the legal salience of the baby’s Cherokee
identity made this difficult. In Cramblett, on the other hand, the parents’
preferred solution was to avoid the difficult identity and community
issues faced by inter-racially adopted and racially mixed children by
choosing a white donor, a solution foreclosed by the bank’s mistake.
The Cramblett complaint seeks to quantify the value of voluntary,
upper-middle class, white family formation, but one need not even use
such a far-flung set of facts to see how such families are valued. It is
readily apparent in the rich history of removing Korean, Chinese,
American Indian, Haitian, Latino and African American children from
their homes and placing them in (or leaving them in search of) good
white homes. It is also apparent in the way the potential adoptive
parents were described in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. Media
accounts describe them as “ideal” parents, emphasizing their
educational pedigree and economic status. 70 The Court’s opinion
70. Addie Rolnick and Kim Pearson, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl Blog Series,
PRAWFSBLAWG, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/07/adoptive-couple-v-babygirl-4-of-4-whiteness-and-ideal-parenthood.html; see Andrew Knapp, Veronica’s Adoptive
Parents Frustrated After Winning Legal Fights, Not Seeing Results, POST AND COURIER (Aug. 8,
2013) (human interest story featuring the adoptive couple’s home and family life); Broken
Home: The Save Veronica Story, CHARLESTON CITY PAPER (Sept. 26, 2012)
http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/broken-home/Content?oid=4185523 (“‘People
try to portray us as these rich people, but I was working at an auto body shop at the time,’ says
Matt, who now works for Boeing. Before this custody case, the couple poured their income into
seven unsuccessful in vitro fertilization attempts and then the legal and travel expenses of
finding Veronica’s birth mother, a Mexican woman living in Oklahoma. ‘We scraped our
money to do the adoption in the first place,’ Melanie says. ‘We saved and borrowed for that.’”);
Robert Barnes, Baby Veronica’s Loved Ones Wait for the Supreme Court to Weigh In,
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emphasizes how they supported mother and baby “emotionally and
financially” during the pregnancy and how the adoptive father “even cut
the umbilical cord.”71 The tenor of both the opinion and most of the
media coverage was one of sympathy for a family who had done
everything right and yet was facing the loss of a child they loved. This
narrative ignores the preceding loss faced by the father, the tribe, and
the baby at the moment she was placed for adoption. It ignores the fact
that children have attachments to their families and communities and in
this sense are not free for the taking, no matter how deserving the
adoptive family.72
In the contest over who could provide a better home for the baby, the
adoptive couple had a built in advantage because they were white,
educated, upper class, and Christian. Historically, this advantage has
been strong enough to overcome even the presumption in favor of
biological parents 73 rights to raise their children. Instead of
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/baby-veronicas-lovedones-wait-for-the-supreme-court-to-weigh-in/2013/04/14/7138b5f0-a526-11e2-a8e25b98cb59187f_story.html (quoting Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal, “Adoptive Couple are ideal
parents who have exhibited the ability to provide a loving family environment for Baby Girl”);
Robin Abcarian, Legal Battle Over Native American Girl Comes to a Poignant End, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/24/local/la-me-ln-legal-battle-babyveronica-native-american-20130924 (“[The child’s birth mother’s] adoption attorney found an
older, childless couple in Charleston, S.C., who wanted to adopt. The couple, Matt and Melanie
Capobianco, were present for the baby’s birth—Matt cut the umbilical cord.”); Suzette Brewer,
Cherokee Nation Mourns as Veronica is Returned to Adoptive Family, INDIAN COUNTRY (Sept.
24, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/09/24/cherokee-nation-mournsveronica-returned-adoptive-family-151418 (“Time will tell what the ultimate outcome will be
for Veronica, who will undoubtedly be given the best of what the Capobiancos can afford in
terms of education and the trappings of an older, upper middle income childless couple.”).
Accord Andrew Cohen, Indian Affairs, Adoption, and Race: The Baby Veronica Case Comes to
Washington, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2013) (“Some of the elements of the case, sadly, harken back
to the bad old days of dark stereotypes about Indians. The adoptive couple, who’ve relentlessly
argued their case in the court of public opinion by appearing on television with the likes of
Anderson Cooper and Dr. Phil, have been widely portrayed as the innocent victims of the story.
Meanwhile, Baby Veronica’s father has been largely portrayed as little more than a shifty, goodfor-nothing drifter.”).
71. 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
72
The failure of imagination in modern family law when it comes to valuing a birth parent’s
rights and a child’s community is stunning, particularly when compared to historic family law
decisions such as Spence-Chapin Adoption Service v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 198 (1971), which
articulated the primacy of a birth parent’s rights as compared to would-be adoptive parents: “A
baby born out-of-wedlock, even of a troubled mother, is not no-one's child. In the inimitable
vernacular, it is not 'up for grabs.' It is not a waif claimable by the first finder, however highly
qualified.” Accord 133 S. Ct. 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It has been the constant practice of
the common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into the world to raise that
child. We do not inquire whether leaving a child with his parents is “in the best interest of the
child.” It sometimes is not; he would be better off raised by someone else. But parents have their
rights, no less than children do.”).
73
Kevin Maillard, A Father’s Struggle to Stop His Daughter’s Adoption, The Atlantic, July 7,

2017 MICH. STATE L. REV. ___ (FORTHCOMING)

counteracting this imbalance, South Carolina74 state law shored up the
adoptive parents’ advantage (as state child welfare laws have
historically done) by according the biological father the same status as
another prospective adoptive parent, erasing the existence of a birth
parent whose rights could possibly trump even the most ideal adoptive
home. ICWA’s enhanced procedural protections would have tipped the
scales back toward balance, but the Court—hiding behind its fear of
making race significant—neutralized its force by holding that it did not
apply to the father’s situation.
In a case with many disturbing angles, this easy erasure of a stable,
loving birth parent may be the most frightening. The record is rife with
facts showing at best ineptitude and at worst deliberate efforts to
circumvent the law. 75 As a result, by the time the case reached the
courts, the baby was two years old and had lived her whole life with her
adoptive parents. Her initial placement with the adoptive parents was
characterized as completely voluntary (on the part of the mother), and
the father’s claim to his own child appeared as an “eleventh hour”
disruption.76 In holding that the ICWA’s protections against involuntary
termination did not apply to a father who had never had custody, the
Court drew a line between the involuntary removal of Indian children
from their families, which the law was designed to stem, and an
adoption “voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with
sole custodial rights.” 77 This dichotomy between voluntary and
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/paternity-registry/396044/ (detailing
the challenges that unmarried men have in establishing rights to their biological children when
the biological mother wishes to terminate parental rights and place a child for adoption).
74
As Professor Maillard points out, South Carolina already had a reputation for laws favoring
adoptive parents. “In the 1980s and 1990s, South Carolina gained a reputation as an ‘adoption
mecca’ for wealthy out-of-state couples seeking children. The lack of protective laws drew
prospective parents who sought quick, easy, and uncontested adoptions. An infamous March
1984 Time magazine article featured a ‘loving, financially secure college-educated couple’ that
placed a personals ad in a local paper for a ‘white newborn,’ promising vacations and expenses
paid for an expectant mother who wanted to ‘LIVE LIKE A QUEEN.’ The same month that the
Time article was published, The New York Times found that doctors and lawyers privately
arranged many adoptions, with little oversight from state agencies. Judges often approved
adoptions with few questions under the assumption that children fared better in adoptive homes.
At the time, no state law prohibited the open sale of children.” Maillard, supra at note 75.
75. Adoption agency notes show that the mother at first refused to name the father
because she thought his Cherokee enrollment would complicate the adoption. When the agency
finally provided notice to the tribe, his name and identifying information were misstated in the
letter, leading the Nation to respond that they could find no enrollment records. The mother
refused contact with the father and his family during the pregnancy and maintained strict
secrecy during the birth itself. The father was not notified of the planned adoption until several
months after the baby had been placed with the adoptive family and the adoption petition had
been filed. Berger, supra note 2, at 302–06.
76. 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
77. Id. at 2562.
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involuntary child welfare proceedings is, of course, too simplistic.78 It
misses the way that racial hierarchies continue to structure ideas about
who deserves children, influencing even decisions that are nominally
voluntary, such as private adoptions.79
Policies shaped by values such as stability and permanency in a
loving home are important, but they should not overshadow the value a
child derives from knowing that her birth relatives want her and that she
is a member of a community. Insofar as idealized homes and a strong
emphasis on stability is cover for moving children of color or low
income status children to richer, better educated white families simply
because prospective parental desires are overvalued, adoption can
involve a problematic leveraging of resources and cultural capital to
attain other people’s children.
EPILOGUE
In spite of the unique legal status of tribal communities and the
presence of a law mandating recognition of that status in child welfare
and adoption context, some members the Court in Adoptive Couple
seemed ready to dismantle, or at least significantly limit the reach of,
the ICWA because of a concern that it places too much emphasis on a
child’s ancestry. 80 As Professor Berger’s analysis of the case
demonstrates, dismissing or failing to talk about the role of race in
adoption is not enough to assuage the Court’s fears, and it leaves the
field open to opponents of tribal sovereignty.
In this sense, the recent lawsuits challenging the ICWA are natural
heirs to Adoptive Couple. The first is an action on behalf of two
adoption organizations,81 one child in foster care, and the birth parents
78. Professor Berger describes the “shift toward easy adoption and away from rights of
biological parents,” including both mothers and fathers, that has characterized state child
welfare law. Berger, supra note 2, at 343–50.
79
The Court characterized the ICWA as being concerned only with the involuntary breakup of
intact Indian families via child welfare intervention, 133 S. Ct. at 2561, but many pre-ICWA
adoptions were also voluntary. See Brief of Adult Pre-ICWA Adoptees, supra note 43 at 5-8,
14-18.
80
See 133 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority's repeated, analytically
unnecessary references to the fact that Baby Girl is 3/256 Cherokee by ancestry do nothing to
elucidate its intimation that the statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied
here.”).
81
The National Council for Adoption is an adoption advocacy organization. Among the “value
statements” listed on the NCFA’s website are the belief that “[e]thnic and cultural identity,
while extremely important considerations, should not prevent a child from finding a permanent,
nurturing family through adoption” and the belief that “[c]ultural and racial identity and birth
history are important to adopted individuals, and every effort should be made to respect and
preserve this information so the adopted individual may retain his or her history and heritage.”
National Council for Adoption, Mission, available at https://adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-
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of another child.82 One of the attorneys listed on the complaint is Lori
Alvino McGill, who represented Maldonado in the Baby Girl case.83
The second suit is a class action organized by the Goldwater Institute on
behalf of two named Indian children in foster care in Arizona,84 their
prospective non-Indian adoptive parents, and “all off-reservation
children with Indian ancestry in the State of Arizona.” 85 Three other
are/mission. NCFA supported passage of the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994 and
legislation designed to facilitate inter-country adoption by granting automatic citizenship to
babies adopted from outside the United States. National Council for Adoption, Federal Adoption
Policy, available at https://adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-are/mission/Federal-Adoption-Policy.
Building Arizona Families is a private, non-profit adoption assistance organization in
Arizona that is a member of NCFA. The company’s website highlights its work facilitating
international adoptions from China and Haiti. Building Arizona Families, International
Adoptions, available at http://www.bafinternational.com/. For a more comprehensive look at the
international adoption industry, particularly adoptions of those “children whose parents are poor
and live in countries where the social services infrastructure for child welfare is limited to
orphanages that families may turn to in a season of need,” see Joyce, supra note 33, at___.
82
National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015). See supra note
18.
83
McGill was also involved in a 2013 challenge to the constitutionality of the ICWA filed on
behalf of Christina Maldonado, another non-Indian birth mother of a Cherokee child, and
unnamed “unwed non-Indian birth mothers” of Indian children. Maldonado v. Holder, Case No.
2:13-cv-02042-DCN (D.S.C., filed July 24, 2013). See Michael Overall, New Lawsuit
Challenges Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, Tulsa World (Jul. 26, 2013). That
lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed in 2014 after Veronica was placed with the Capobiancos and
another plaintiff “‘decided to keep her baby rather than allow the tribe to choose who would
raise her child.’” Samantha Vicent, Baby Veronica’s Birth Mother Dropping Related Lawsuit
Against Cherokees, U.S., Tulsa World (April 8, 2014) (quoting McGill). McGill also
represented the foster parents in a California case in which the court ordered a Choctaw foster
child removed from her non-Indian foster placement, where she had been temporarily placed
with the consent of the tribe to facilitate reunification efforts, and placed with (non-Indian)
relatives in compliance with the ICWA. After unsuccessfully arguing in the lower courts that
Adoptive Couple made the law inapplicable to the child’s situation, In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal.
App. 4th 1322, 1337 (2014), the foster parents sought U.S. Supreme Court review of whether
the ICWA applies at all a child who was not being removed from an “existing Indian family.”
R.P. and S.P. v. California Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 137 S. Ct. 713 (2017) (denying
request for certiorari). See Suzette Brewer, Supreme Court Denies Hearing in Lexi Case, Indian
Country Media Network (Jan. 11, 2017); Suzette Brewer, ICWA: Lexi to Remain with Utah
Family in Appeals Court Ruling, Indian Country Media Network (Jul. 9, 2016) (describing
California litigation); Richard Prince, “Everything Was Wrong” in Coverage of Indian Child
Custody
Case,
Journal-isms
(Mar.
26,
2016),
available
at
http://journalisms.com/2016/03/everything-wrong-in-coverage-of-indian-child-custody-case/
(describing
inaccurate media coverage that strongly sympathized with the foster parents).
84
The named children are both younger than five years old. Although seeking certification on
behalf of all Indian children in the Arizona child welfare system, the complaint specifically
alleges that the named children are each “more than 50%” non-Indian blood.
85
A.D. v. Washburn, Case No. 2:15-cv-01259-DKD (D. Ariz., filed Jul. 6, 2015). See supra note
18. The Goldwater Institute has developed a website to support the lawsuit, which refers to the
ICWA as “a well-intentioned but a profoundly flawed and unconstitutional federal law” and
includes several policy reports supporting its campaign against the law. Goldwater Institute,
A.D.
v.
Washburn:
Equal
Protection
for
Indian
Children,
available
at
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lawsuits challenge the constitutionality of various state laws that parallel
the ICWA: two suits by biological parents of Indian children who want
to place their children with non-Indian parents through private adoption
agencies86 and a third suit by non-Indian foster parents seeking to adopt
Indian foster children.87
The new lawsuits88 lay bare the parallels between efforts to pass the
MEPA and the IEP and efforts to overturn the ICWA. The lawsuits
characterize ICWA and related state laws as impeding (white) parents’
access to Native children in the same way that informal race matching
policies did before MEPA and the IEP tilted the scales in favor of
parental access and reintroduced a language of neutrality that prevented
full consideration of children’s best interests. ICWA’s opponents see it
as another instance of race matching that must be defeated. At least one
court has correctly dismissed this argument, pointing out that the ICWA
applies based on a child’s citizenship status, not her biological ties, but
the lawsuits are ongoing.
The law is clearly constitutional, but sound legal arguments have not
dissuaded critics’ racial anxieties. In Adoptive Couple, the Court left a
crack of doubt, and scores of litigants have stepped in to pry the crack
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/constitutional-rights/equal-protection/case/equalprotection-for-indian-children/.
86
Doe v. Jesson, No. 15-cv-02639 (D. Minn., complaint filed June 3, 2015) (challenging
Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act); Doe v. Pruitt, No. 15-cv-00471 (D. Okla.;
complaint filed Aug. 19, 2015).
87
C.E.S. v. Nelson, No. 15-cv-982 (D. Mich., complaint filed Sep. 29, 2015).
88
It is worth noting that none of the children named the two ICWA lawsuits were removed from
their homes because of allegations of physical or sexual abuse by their parents. The A.D. and
National Council for Adoption complaints describe voluntary adoptive placements, maternal
exposure to controlled substances, felony conviction of a child’s mother, incarceration of a
child’s father, and accidental injury of a child who was left in the care of a relative while his
mother was at work, with the mother unable to provide 24-hour nursing care required as a result
of the injury. See A.D. v. Washburn, Case No. 2:15-cv-01259-DKD, Civil Rights Class Action
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (E.D. Ariz.) (filed Jul. 6, 2015), para. 17, 21;
National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, Case No. 1:15-cv-6756BL-MSN, Complaint and
Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (E.D. Va.) (filed May 27, 2015), para. 21-22, 32.
Similarly, the children in C.E.S. were in foster care because of allegations of substance abuse,
mental illness, and neglect by their biological mother. (Their father had a history of domestic
violence and possible sexual abuse, but the complaint suggests they were in the custody of their
mother, and that her victimization may have contributed to her inability to care for them.)
Verified Compl. For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, C.E.S. v. Nelson, No. 15-cv-982 (D.
Mich. Sep. 29, 2015), para 23-38. Without commenting on the specifics of any case, these are
all circumstances where additional resources provided to the child’s family or community could
potentially have obviated the need for removal. For a related discussion in the context of
international adoption, see Joyce, supra note 33 at xiii (noting that “in an overwhelming number
of cases children were relinquished because of poverty alone, when a fraction of the huge sums
adopting parents were paying to agencies could have brought birth families out of poverty many
times over”).
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open. 89 Laws that protect Native children are distinguishable from
proposed laws to protect other children of color. But, because both
challenge the baseline assumptions about ideal parenthood and access to
children that have shaped adoption policy, resistance to ICWA is driven
by the same investments that supported enactment of MEPA and IEP.

89

In order to monitor and coordinate responses to the onslaught of cases, several Native rights
and child welfare organizations have formed a coalition called the ICWA Defense Project. See
Kathryn E. Fort, ICWA Appellate Project and the ICWA Defense Project, Turtle Talk, available
at https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/fort/icwa/.

